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BOOK REVIEW 
PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 
Laurie R. Blank* 
In the nearly ten years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the legal 
framework to address terrorism and terrorist attacks has grown, stretched, and 
been tested from all angles. Once viewed predominantly—if not exclusively—
as a law enforcement issue, counter-terrorism now involves a robust military 
response along with the accompanying legal issues.1 The study of counter-
terrorism and the law applicable to both terrorist acts and responses to 
terrorism has, naturally, become widespread at law schools and other 
institutions of higher learning across the United States and worldwide. 
Principles of Counter-Terrorism Law2 is a useful and comprehensive addition 
to this fast-moving field, where new issues arise, cases are decided, and 
responses are debated nearly daily. It is concise and easily digested, as 
appropriate for a hornbook, yet it also offers students and other readers a 
thorough analysis and grasp of the full range of issues triggered by terrorism 
and counter-terror operations and efforts. 
In a clear nod to the war-based framework the United States has taken in 
combating terrorism over the past decade, the authors of Principles of Counter-
Terrorism Law devote the first half of the book to the analysis of “the military 
response.” In the second half of the book, the authors, Jimmy Gurulé and 
Geoffrey S. Corn, address the vast set of non-military tools the United States 
employs in three parts: “the law enforcement response”; “economic sanctions”; 
and “civil causes of action.” Unlike most exhaustive casebooks on anti-
terrorism law, this approach places much greater emphasis on the law that 
regulates military operations, the use of force, and the legal issues stemming 
from the application of military force against terrorist groups.3 As the authors 
explain, 9/11 brought “a profound philosophical shift in national security 
policy”4 from a law-enforcement approach to counter-terrorism to a new 
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 1 JIMMY GURULÉ & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 27–29 (2011). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. at vi. 
 4 Id. at v. 
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situation in which defeating terrorism—rather than managing it—is the order 
of the day.5 “The most significant aspect of this reaction [is] the invocation of 
wartime legal authority to achieve this critical national security objective.”6 
The focus and layout of the book matches this philosophical shift. 
The benefits of this approach are clear. The introduction of a military or 
wartime framework brings with it additional legal frameworks beyond the 
inherent questions of executive power, separation of powers, and other 
domestic questions relating to the use of military power.7 International law, 
specifically the law governing the use of force and the law of armed conflict, is 
a critical piece of the legal framework once the wartime paradigm is invoked.8 
For this reason, the approach that Gurulé and Corn take—a thorough and equal 
treatment of the legal consequences of a military response to terrorism as well 
as the law-enforcement and civil approaches—offers readers, both students and 
faculty alike, an essential set of tools for analyzing counter-terrorism. 
The first five chapters address the military response to terrorism, starting 
from the right to use force, setting out the framework of the law of armed 
conflict as it applies to counter-terror operations, and then moving on to the 
key issues of targeting, detention, and trial. In many ways, the first two 
chapters provide one of this book’s great contributions: the focus on a clear 
explication of the international legal framework that governs the use of force 
and the conduct of hostilities within the context of the global struggle against 
terrorism. The legal framework for wartime authority is inherently different 
from a peacetime framework, and understanding this difference is key to 
grasping the legal controversies surrounding targeted killing, detention, 
military commissions, and other issues that have dominated the past decade of 
debates surrounding post-9/11 U.S. policies and operations.9 
As a first step, therefore, students and others exploring counter-terrorism 
law in the post-9/11 world need foundational information about the 
international legal parameters surrounding the use of force in the international 
sphere. The first chapter takes the classic United Nations (“UN”) framework 
and applies it to terrorism, particularly transnational terrorism. The UN Charter 
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prohibits the use of force by one state against another in Article 2(4),10 with 
only two exceptions: (1) multinational security action authorized under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter;11 or (2) the use of force in individual or 
collective self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.12 
Notwithstanding decades of precedent regarding when the use of force 
constitutes an armed attack sufficient to trigger the right of self-defense, 
whether a transnational attack by terrorists could constitute an armed attack for 
such purposes remained an open question.13 The first chapter analyzes the UN 
framework in the context of the 9/11 attacks, including questions of 
proportionate response,14 the exhaustion of the right of self-defense,15 and how 
the Iraq War fits into this framework.16 
The second stage of the foundational background necessary to analyze 
targeting, detention, and trial, among other issues, is in the discussion of the 
law of armed conflict in Chapter 2. As the authors note, the decision to invoke 
wartime authority in response to the 9/11 attacks and engage in a robust 
military response to terrorism brought the law of armed conflict into direct 
application.17 To understand when it applies, whether it should apply to 
counter-terrorism operations, and how it applies, this chapter provides a brief 
overview of the purposes of the law of armed conflict and the triggering 
mechanisms for its application. In particular, this chapter explores the “fit” 
between the law of armed conflict and counter-terror operations—both whether 
military operations against terrorist groups fall within the traditional categories 
of armed conflict and the consequences of a determination that the operations 
do not.18 Although the debate over the application of the law of armed conflict 
to counter-terrorism continues on many levels, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld19 put an end to the characterization debate, at least in the 
 
 10 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
 11 See U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 12 See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 13 See GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 8. 
 14 Id. at 15–16. 
 15 Id. at 16–18. 
 16 Id. at 18–19. 
 17 Id. at 28–30. 
 18 See id. 
 19 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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United States, by holding that the conflict with al-Qaeda is a non-international 
armed conflict under common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.20 
With this background in hand, the military response section then continues 
to tackle the difficult—and still constantly debated—questions of targeting, 
detention, and trial. Each of these questions first demands the application of 
traditional law of armed conflict categories, such as combatant and civilian, to 
terrorists.21 In the areas of targeting and detention, Chapters 3 and 4 marry an 
explanation of traditional frameworks for targeting and detention to the 
exigencies and complications of today’s conflict with al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups. 
Questions of targeting turn, at the most basic level, on the distinction 
between armed conflict, which triggers the authority to use deadly force as first 
resort, and law enforcement, in which deadly force is reserved as a last resort. 
Chapter 3 on “Targeting Terrorists with Military Force” thus addresses when 
terrorists are legitimate targets within an armed conflict framework and the 
legal framework that governs targeting, including the principles of distinction, 
proportionality, and military necessity. Chapter 4 on detention draws on the 
same law of armed conflict framework of categorizing persons as lawful 
combatants and mixes an explanation of combatant and prisoner of war status 
in the traditional framework with an analysis of U.S. jurisprudence both pre- 
and post-9/11. The reader is taken on a quick tour of the critical cases forming 
the core structure of the U.S. system of detention of enemy belligerents22—
previously called “enemy combatants” until that term was phased out at the 
start of the Obama Administration.23 In addition to covering procedural and 
treatment issues, Chapter 4 gives the reader the jurisprudential and 
international legal foundation to understand the linkage between preventive 
detention in the war with al Qaeda and traditional law of war detention.24 
A prisoner of war (“POW”) is traditionally held in protective custody and 
cannot be prosecuted for lawful acts during combat; the law does, however, 
provide for prosecution for crimes committed during captivity and for pre-
 
 20 Id. at 630. 
 21 See GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 70–81. 
 22 See id. at 97–103. 
 23 William Glaberson, U.S. Won’t Label Terror Suspects as “Combatants,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, 
at A1. 
 24 See GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 104–14. 
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capture violations of the law of war.25 As discussed in the chapters on targeting 
and detention, however, terrorist operatives do not qualify for POW status.26 
The final chapter in “The Military Response” section, Chapter 5, addresses the 
use of military commissions to try persons captured and detained in the course 
of the “War on Terror.” Like the previous two chapters, this chapter blends a 
discussion of the traditional use of military commissions with an analysis of 
how that framework can apply to counter-terrorism. It also analyzes the three 
most controversial crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the military 
commissions—conspiracy,27 material support for terrorism,28 and murder in 
violation of the law of war29—and shows how the claim for subject-matter 
jurisdiction over these crimes is tenuous at best under the law of armed 
conflict. 
Notwithstanding the U.S. invocation of an armed conflict framework and 
the great focus in the media and academic debates on the application of the law 
of armed conflict to counter-terror operations,30 counter-terrorism involves far 
more than simply the application of military force and military jurisdiction. 
The natural counter to a military response is a law-enforcement response, the 
traditional approach to counter-terrorism before 9/11.31 
In Part II, the authors provide a thorough overview of the components of 
the law enforcement response to terrorism, beginning with the framework for 
gathering intelligence information. Intelligence is the lifeblood of counter-
terrorism and the United States has a robust and comprehensive set of laws and 
paradigms for intelligence gathering.32 To that end, Chapter 6 introduces the 
reader to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), explaining the 
nature of the statutory framework and how FISA, as amended, has become a 
major tool for the gathering of intelligence information.33 After detailing the 
process for applying for court orders, issuing court orders, authorizing 
wiretaps, and compelling the production of business records,34 this chapter 
 
 25 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 82–108, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 26 See GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 106. 
 27 See id. at 181–85. 
 28 Id. at 189–92. 
 29 Id. at 185–89. 
 30 See id. at 27–64. 
 31 Id. at 27–28. 
 32 Id. at 205 nn.1–5. 
 33 Id. at 27. 
 34 Id. at 208–23. 
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then examines the range of legal challenges to FISA, such as standing 
requirements35 and constitutional challenges under the Fourth Amendment.36 
National security letters, which round out the intelligence-gathering tools in 
Chapter 6, have been another major means used by the federal government as a 
law-enforcement response, especially in the post-9/11 years, when Congress 
expanded the parameters of this tool through broader definitions and wider 
agency authority while at the same time creating judicial review procedures 
and enforcement mechanisms for challenging the requests.37 
Attention may be focused on military detention and prosecution of 
suspected terrorists, but the prosecution of suspected terrorists in federal 
civilian courts continues apace.38 The primary provisions for prosecuting 
international terrorists are the material support statutes, discussed at length in 
Chapter 7.39 After explaining the statutory framework, this chapter then 
discusses the authority to designate an entity a “foreign terrorist organization” 
(“FTO”).40 Numerous cases have challenged both FTO designations and the 
material support statutes in general over the past several years, on a wide range 
of legal grounds.41 One of the most recent cases, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project,42 raised a number of those challenges directly, including freedom of 
association and freedom of speech under the First Amendment, vagueness, and 
scienter.43 
Just as intelligence is the lifeblood of counter-terrorism, so financial 
resources are the lifeblood of terrorism. To that end, the United States and 
other countries have enacted a comprehensive web of domestic and 
international economic sanctions to freeze terrorist resources and drastically 
curtail their ability to plan and launch attacks.44 As noted in Chapter 8, starving 
terrorists and terrorist organizations not only prevents terrorist attacks, but it 
also helps generate new leads to identify previously unknown terrorists, 
terrorist cells, and terrorist financiers.45 The blocking of assets under the 
 
 35 Id. at 223–27. 
 36 Id. at 228–36. 
 37 Id. at 241–49. 
 38 See id. at 257. 
 39 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2006). 
 40 GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 261–63. 
 41 See id. at 261–63 nn.38–51. 
 42 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 43 Id. at 2712. 
 44 GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 295–96. 
 45 Id. at 295. 
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International Emergency Economic Powers Act46 and Executive Order 1322447 
is analyzed in detail. The Act authorizes the President to declare a national 
emergency to deal with a particular threat and then block the transfer of any 
property in which a foreign national has any interest.48 The Executive Order, 
signed directly in response to the attacks of 9/11, authorizes the Secretary of 
the Treasury to block the property of designated members of al-Qaeda, 
affiliated groups, Islamic charities suspected of funding al-Qaeda, and other 
similar entities.49 The legal challenges to such sanctions, which have sprouted 
in the past several years, are analyzed extensively in this chapter. 
This U.S. framework for domestic economic sanctions goes hand-in-hand 
with the international sanctions enacted by the UN Security Council in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11 and builds on the sanctions against the Taliban 
dating back to 1999.50 After first declaring that international terrorism poses a 
serious threat to international peace and security in Resolution 136851—the 
trigger for Chapter VII action52—the Security Council established a detailed 
system which demanded the freezing of terrorist assets by all States and a 
Sanctions Committee to oversee this regime.53 Chapter 9 details thoroughly the 
framework and procedures before addressing the major challenges to the UN 
Sanctions regime presented in two recent cases before the European Court of 
Justice: Kadi54 and Al Barakaat.55 In further explaining the legal controversy 
surrounding the international sanctions regime, this chapter gives the reader the 
tools to analyze one set of non-military tools available to the international 
community in combating terrorism. 
Until this point, the military, law-enforcement, and economic responses to 
terrorism outlined in Principles of Counter-Terrorism Law focus on 
governmental and international options and paradigms for addressing 
terrorism. The final section introduces the victims of terrorism by highlighting 
the use of civil liability and private actions against terrorists and their 
 
 46 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2006). 
 47 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 75 Fed. Reg. 81717 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
 48 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 49 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 75 Fed. Reg. 81717 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
 50 GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 331. 
 51 S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
 52 U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. 
 53 GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 342 (citing S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999)). 
 54 Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649. 
 55 Case T-306/01, Yusuf & Al-Barakaat Int’l Fund v. Council of Eur. Union & Comm’n of Eur. 
Communities, 2005 E.C.R.II-3535. 
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sponsors.56 Dating as far back as the Alien Tort Claims Act,57 enacted in 1789, 
and including recent statutory enactments such as the Antiterrorism Act of 
1991,58 the Torture Victim Protection Act59 and the state-sponsored terrorism 
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,60 Congress has legislated a 
number of statutes authorizing civil liability for personal injury or death caused 
by acts of terrorism. Such lawsuits can promote key goals in the fight against 
terrorism, as Chapter 10 explores in great depth: recovery of damages for 
victims, seizing of assets of terrorists, and deterrence, particularly for the 
individuals and organizations funding terrorist attacks. Just as economic 
sanctions cut off the flow of money to terrorists, civil judgments can help 
disrupt terrorist financial networks.61 For all these reasons, this section is a 
critical component of the overall and far-reaching coverage of the entirety of 
counter-terror options and responses addressed in this book. 
After a comprehensive discussion of the theories of liability, main cases, 
and legal challenges to liability under these civil statutes, Chapter 10 comes 
full circle to examine whether civil liability—as presently conceived in the 
United States—can achieve the goals set forth at the beginning of the chapter.62 
Indeed, several obstacles exist: terrorists rarely have property in the United 
States, which makes attachment of judgments unlikely; foreign sovereign 
immunity precludes prosecution in cases in which a State has not been 
designated as a State sponsor of terrorism; and sensitive diplomatic and foreign 
policy interests often drive the U.S. government to block the attachment of 
frozen assets.63 
Principles of Counter-Terrorism Law is a welcome addition to the 
literature on the law relevant to counter-terrorism for its comprehensive 
coverage of the issues and clear explication of the legal questions and 
controversies. The analysis of all facets of counter-terrorism law, from the 
military to the economic to the role of civil liability, gives the reader a truly 
bird’s-eye view of this growing and important area of domestic and 
international law. 
 
 56 GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 1, at 367. 
 57 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (originally enacted as Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73). 
 58 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2006). 
 59 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)) . 
 60 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (2006). 
 61 Id. at 368. 
 62 Id. at 428–29. 
 63 Id. 
